The most relevant aspects of the aforementioned amendment are:
- The Justices of the Mexican Supreme Court of Justice (MSCJ), the Magistrates of the Collegiate Circuit Courts (CCC) and the District Judges would be appointed by the election through direct and secret vote of the citizens (more than 1,500 officials).
- The MSCJ would be integrated with 9 Justices instead of 11 and would only function in Plenary session, thus disappearing its Chambers.
- The mandate of the MSCJ Justices would be 8, 11 and 14 years, depending on who obtains the most votes during the election process.
- The mandate of the CCC Magistrates and the District Judges would be 9 years and they could be re-elected.
- Both the Executive Branch, as well as the Legislative and Judicial Branches, would propose the candidates to occupy positions in the FJB.
- The electoral authority would be in charge of organizing the election process of the MSCJ Justices, CCC Magistrates and the District Judges.
- The Justices of the MSCJ, the Magistrates of the CCC and the District Judges who are currently in office, would conclude their duties in advance and on the date on which the elected officials take up their duties.
- The Federal Judiciary Council would be replaced by the Judicial Administration Body, which would be made up of officials from the 3 Branches.
- A Judicial Disciplinary Court would be created whose members would be appointed by the election through direct and secret vote of the citizens.
- The granting for stay of executions with general effects against laws or regulations would be prohibited.
- The amendment provides that secondary legislation to implement the constitutional reform must be issued within 180 calendar days (approximately 6 months) following the entry into force of the reform.
We consider that this amendment would not improve the delivery of objective, impartial, rational, prompt and expeditious justice; on the contrary, it would deteriorate it by subjecting the members of the FJB to the interests of the Executive and Legislative Branches. We estimate that it would cause, among others:
- The breaking of the division of Powers as one of the basic pillars of democracy.
- Multiple conflicts of interest (e. type of corruption) between the elected candidates and those who proposed them and provided them with resources, even with the voters themselves.
- Exponential corruption in its several modalities without mechanisms to prevent and mitigate it.
- The absence of career Justices, Magistrates and District Judges within the FJB.
- Having candidates chosen without the broad, in-depth knowledge and legal technique required by such delicate assignments.
- Direct interference by other Powers in the FJB would totally undermine its impartiality.
- The FJB would be subject to purely political interests and not to the interests of true social justice, which would erode its independence.
If the reform is approved in practically all its terms, all the means and defense mechanisms that we have as citizens to protect ourselves from illegal and arbitrary acts by the authorities would be restricted and coerced, since those would be resolved by officials with questionable capacity and lack of impartiality, among other deficiencies.
If you have any questions regarding the foregoing, please do not hesitate to contact us.
Mexico City, June 14th, 2024
